15th session of seminars on research in energy economics at paris-sciences-lettres
Abstract
Programme and Presentations
The Seminar on Research in Energy Economics at Paris-Sciences-Lettres is jointly organized by the CERNA, the CGEMP, the Chaire European Electricity Markets, Mines ParisTech and University Paris-Dauphine. It is animated by François LEVEQUE (CERNA et MINES PARIS TECH) and Dominique FINON (Chaire European Electricity Markets, CNRS-CIRED).
Bertrand VILLENEUVE, Professeur, LEDA, Université Paris-Dauphine
Strategic Capacity Investments under Holdup Threats in the Energy Sector: The Role of Contract Length and Width
Presentation
This paper analyzes the impact of the length of incomplete contracts on investment and surplus sharing. In the bilateral relationship explored, the seller controls the input and the buyer invests. With two-part tariffs, the length of the contract is irrelevant: surplus is maximal and goes all to the seller. If total surplus is targeted, or if sellers are left free, contracts will be as short as possible. If regulators can favor buyers, prohibibiting nonlinear pricing and forcing long contracts are the best solutions. The interaction of a restriction (width) with another (length) is explained in detail. Pipelines and large energy equipment are the main examples.
LEDA Working Paper 2013, co-écrit avec Laure Durand-Viel (Autorité de la concurrence et Paris Dauphine)
Nikolas WÖLFING, Centre for European Economic Research ZEW Mannheim
The Effect of Regulatory Scrutiny Asymmetric Cost Pass-through in Power Wholesale and its End
In this paper we find an asymmetric pass-through of European Emission Allowance (EUA) prices to wholesale electricity prices in Germany in the first phase of the EU ETS, which reveals an oligopolistic behaviour. More importantly we show that this asymmetry has disappeared in response to a report on investigations by the competition authority. The asymmetric pricing pattern, however, was not detected at the time of the report, nor had it been part of the investigations. Our results therefore provide evidence of the deterring effect of regulatory monitoring on firms which exhibit non-competitive pricing behavior. We do not find any asymmetric pass-through of EUA prices in recent years. Several robustness checks support our results. Article paru dans le Journal of Regulatory Economics, Vol. 45, April 2014 et co-écrit avec Frieder Mokinski (ZEW).
